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The semi-presidential system of Cape 
Verde: the relationship between the 
executive and the legislative powers*
O sistema semi-presidencialista cabo-
verdiano: a relação entre os poderes 
executivo e legislativo
Abstract
e article analyses the relationship established between the exe-
cutive and legislative powers in the Cape Verdean government system 
where researchers seek to understand it, taking into account their theore-
tical and constitutional setting practice. It should be noted the prominen-
ce of the debate and studies undertaken to understand how the scientic 
academy seeks to eradicate this problem. Two issues are relevant in this 
debate: the rst reporting to the theoretical and constitutional congura-
tion of Cape Verdean government system and the other to its policy and 
legislative practice.
Keywords: Cape Verde. Semi-presidential System. Systems of Govern-
ment. Legislative and Executive Powers.
Resumo
O artigo procura analisar a relação que se estabelece entre o pod-
er executivo e legislativo no sistema de governo cabo-verdiano, onde In-
vestigadores buscam compreendê-lo, tendo em conta a sua conguração 
prática, teórica e constitucional. Há que realçar a proeminência do debate 
e dos estudos realizados no sentido de compreender como é que a ac-
ademia cientíca procura debelar esta problemática. Duas questões são 
pertinentes neste debate: a primeira refere-se à conguração teórico-con-
stitucional do sistema de governo cabo-verdiano e a outra à prática políti-
ca e legislativa.
Palavras-chave: Cabo Verde. Sistema Semi-presidencialista. Sistemas de Go-
verno. Poder legislativo e Poder Executivo.
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1 Introduction
Research on systems of government is frequent 
in Political Science, having its resurgence in the 20th 
century been marked by the process of democratisation 
of many States. In this article we seek to centralise our 
research within a constitutional, legal, sociological and 
institutional analysis of the Cape Verdean government 
system characterised as semi-presidential, trying to de-
scribe the relationship among the di erent institutional 
actors within the framework of the division of powers, in 
the context where it is assumed that these powers were 
assigned to prevent their concentration and not to impair 
the functioning of the various political and legal bodies.. 
In the Cape Verdean endogenous context we rec-
ognise that the system of government is one of the themes 
that enriches the  eld of Political Science, especially in the 
 eld of Constitutional Law, and we verify that, from the 
scope and complexity of the theme, we are challenged to 
seek to understand the constitutional engineering (SAR-
TORI, 1996) which sustains that system under analysis. It 
is also a subject of some academic and scienti c produc-
tion, although there are no studies that develop theoreti-
cal and empirical issues involving the relations of powers 
in the con guration of the Cape Verdean government 
system, as we witness a weak doctrine of scienti c pro-
duction (SILVA, 2009; ALMADA, 2002; LIMA, 2004), 
which, in general, is one of the features of the studies on 
the relations of power in African democracies.
From the few scienti c productions that exist, we 
will highlight here some, such as those of Roselma Évora 
who seeks to understand democracy and the con gura-
tion of the government system in the political and consti-
tutional context. It is the case of the article “Cape Verde: 
Democracy and the system of government” (2013) and 
also of the doctoral thesis “ e Legislative Power in the 
Democratic System in Cape Verde” (2009). Daniel Costa’s 
article on “ e role of the Head of State in the Cape Ver-
dean Semi-presidential system” (2009) and the master’s 
thesis on “ e Semi-presidential system in Cape Verde, 
1991/2000”, where he seeks to focus on the debate on the 
system of government that is con gured from the politi-
cal openness (1991) and the powers of the President of 
the Republic a er successive constitutional revisions.
David Hop er Almada, in 2002, published the 
book “ e Presidential Issue in Cape Verde: a matter of 
Regime” describing the role of the President in the Cape 
Verdean political scene, and envisaging possible con icts 
at the time of cohabitation between the President of the 
Republic and the Prime Minister if they were not from 
the same political party. Raul Araújo published in 2000 
the book “ e Systems of Government of Democratic 
Transition in the P.A.L.O.P.” Making a brief analysis of 
the Cape Verdean government system, from the politi-
cal openness and the adoption of the new Constitution of 
the Republic in 1992, he even characterises the system as 
parliamentary in its essence. In 2007, Vitalino Canas and 
Jorge Carlos Fonseca published the joint article on “Cape 
Verde: A Successful Semi-Presidential System?” where 
they focus on the endogenous and international debates 
about the Cape Verdean government system, arguing 
that, a er the political openness, Cape Verde adopted a 
semi-presidential system.
Taking into account that these productions do not 
deepen the issues of the relations of powers in the Cape 
Verdean government system, we seek, with this article, 
to innovate the  eld of research on political institutions 
in democracies, encouraging further studies about the 
region where Cape Verde is framed, with the probability 
of bringing the institutional background to the context 
under analysis. Since the independence of Cape Verde, 
and, therefore, of the setting of the one-party system, 
there are, in the political and academic scenery, debates 
on the system of government that would be set up a er 
the national independence and the functioning of the 
political institutions involved in it. With this article we 
seek to think about this issue, understanding divergent 
and convergent points of view, envisaging new paradigms 
that have emerged over the years in which Cape Verde 
became an independent State. 
2 Revisiting the various systems of Govern-
ment
 ere are, depending on the reality of each coun-
try, speci c settings in the systems of government. How-
ever, there is a set of elements that characterise and distin-
guish each of them.  ere are three types of government 
that prevail in democracies, which are the presidential, 
the parliamentary and the semi-presidential (LIJPHART, 
2003).
In the presidential system, the executive power 
is monocephalic, that is, the President is Head of State 
and of Government, yet aided by Ministers appointed by 
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him. Both the President and the Parliament are elected 
by direct and universal su rage, and the  rst is not politi-
cally responsible for the second.  e President cannot be 
dismissed by Parliament, but that can occur through the 
process of impeachment, if he is involved in crimes.  e 
way the President is elected allows him to enjoy a broader 
legitimacy before the Parliament, being that the program 
of his government does not always coincide with the ide-
als and political conceptions of parliamentary majority. 
However, if the President cannot bring together in Parlia-
ment a majority to support him, he will have some di  -
culties to implement certain policies because, in this case, 
the Parliament as well cannot be dissolved by the Execu-
tive, which gives it autonomy, albeit relative.
 e presidential system ensures greater politi-
cal stability because, constitutionally, the President has 
a  xed term that exists for a set time, allowing him to 
carry out social changes objectively established. On the 
other hand, this system of government has its disadvan-
tages and one of them is the concentration of powers in 
the person of the President of the Republic, which can 
enhance less democratic attitudes centered in the  eld of 
authoritarianism. Serious institutional crisis can also oc-
cur concerning the possible disagreements between the 
Legislative and the Executive powers, being that there are 
no ingenious instruments to quickly resolve political cri-
ses, as we see in the parliamentary system.  e U.S.A and 
Brazil are pointed out as the most ruined and paradig-
matic of the presidential system.
DIn the Parliamentary system there is the shar-
ing of the executive power between the President and the 
Head of Government (Prime Minister), being the latter 
appointed or chosen by the Parliament.  e President of 
the Republic exercises merely ceremonial functions and 
of symbolic representation of the State, depending on the 
investiture of the Parliament, and the government will 
have to excel for a stable majority in Parliament; other-
wise, it can be dissolved, forming a new government of 
parliamentary basis (PASQUINO, 2005). Normally the 
Head of Government comes from the board of the politi-
cal party that gets the parliamentary majority or from the 
coalition of parties that support him, and thus we believe 
that his political-administrative knowledge can facilitate 
his action vis-à-vis the Parliament.
Some advantages are assigned to this system of 
government such as the relationship established between 
the Executive (Government) and the Legislative powers 
(Parliament), enabling greater articulation and recon-
ciliation among them (FERREIRA FILHO, 1993).  e 
government does not have a  xed mandate, because it 
depends on the parliamentary support and the political 
environment within the framework of the political con-
 dence of the partisan majority that supports it. If there 
are di erences between the Head of Government and 
the parliamentary majority that supports him, the risk of 
withdrawing his support to the Government may occur, 
which is one of the disadvantages of the parliamentary 
system. 
In the semi-presidential system, the Head of State 
(President) is elected by direct and secret su rage for a 
constitutionally determined period, and the same hap-
pens with the Parliament. However, if Parliament has a 
stable and coherent majority, the Head of State is exactly 
in the opposite situation, since the Executive power is 
cephalic, that is, the Head of Government, normally the 
Prime Minister, with a parliamentary majority, will be 
able to rule without interruption and with the supremacy 
within the executive power, if the Head of State does not 
have the support of the same party that represents the 
majority in Parliament. In this case the Prime Minister 
has the political responsibility vis-à-vis the Parliament. 
 e President has, among other powers, that of appoint-
ing and exonerating the Prime Minister by listening to 
the parliamentary forces in accordance with the results of 
the legislative elections, and he can also dissolve the Par-
liament in the event of serious institutional crisis.  e in-
dependence of the Head of State, his promotional power 
and the threat of dissolution facilitate the mechanism of 
minority governments. It is the case of the current pro-
cess in Portugal and other European countries.
 e practical con guration of these government 
systems analysed above depends on the reality of each 
country. Duverger (1978), when analysing the powers of 
the President, emphasises that there are countries where 
the President comes from a direct popular election, and 
in practice he may have weak or strong powers and vice 
versa. In France, the Constitution assigns few powers to 
the President, who in practice has, in fact, strong powers; 
and there are countries that face inverse situations.  e 
degree of power of a President is related to the parliamen-
tary seats, and there are di erences between a President 
with a majority and another one without a parliamentary 
majority.
In this process of practical con guration we high-
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light the relationship between the executive and the legis-
lative powers. It is a general rule that in democracies the 
legislative power belongs to Parliament and the executive 
to the Government.  e Parliament is a political institu-
tion formed by one or more assemblies (monocameralist 
or bicameralist) with a set of powers such as legislation 
and supervision (DUVERGER, 1985). 
 e Government has the executive power, as it is 
the institution that holds the unit to execute the laws and, 
therefore, to monitor their applications, having several 
senses:  rst, it can designate the whole of the political 
bodies of the State; secondly, it can designate a particular 
government body; and third, it can also “designate only 
one element of this Executive, the Ministry or the min-
isterial o  ce, as opposed to the Head of State” (DUVER-
GER, 1985, p. 117). In any system of Government it is 
important to establish a relationship of complementarity 
between the powers, especially between the Executive 
and the Legislative. However, there are variations with 
regard to balance or imbalance between them.
Lijphart (2003), in a study carried out in the pe-
riod from 1945 to 1996 of 36 countries with democracy, 
con rms that in parliamentary systems we can notice 
a certain balance of powers between the o  ce and the 
Parliament, as it happens in Belgium, but it is also pos-
sible to  nd a clear predominance of the Executive, as in 
the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Barbados, since 
the same margin of variation also occurs in presidential 
and semi-presidential systems.  ese signi cant vari-
ations depend on a set of institutional con gurations 
such as the duration of the o  ces (LIJPHART, 2003); 
the relationship between the parties and the O  ces or 
of parliamentary majorities (PASQUINO, 2002), and, 
above all, the characteristics that every system of Gov-
ernment has (LIJPHART, 2003; MALAMUD, 2003; 
GROHMANN, 2001). 
3 The Institutionalisation of the semi-presiden-
tial system in Africa: the case of Cape Verde
With the third wave of democratisation (HUN-
TINGTON, 1991), many African States which were un-
der the rule of authoritarian one-party regimes, chose to 
change into multiparty democratic regimes and two insti-
tutional con gurations were fundamental, being the  rst 
one the adoption of a new Electoral system and the other 
of a new system of Government (PEREIRA, 2013). We 
consider, taking into account the vast African literature 
before its period of political transition, that many African 
States a er independence opted for a system of Govern-
ment which was characterised as presidential one-party 
regime, which legitimised through a hegemonic discourse 
that preached the centralisation of power in one person, 
or structure (usually military), as a condition to “protect 
national interests, ensure national unity and avoid social 
breakdown” (ÉVORA, 2013, p. 336).
Before this scenario, the presidential government 
system, that some African States had, was the subject of 
some speculation. On the one hand, they advocated that 
the presidential system held the danger of personi ca-
tion of power (LINZ, 1990) and that, therefore, it would 
be better to adopt the parliamentary (LIJPHART, 1991) 
or semi-presidential (ELGIE, 2004) system; on the other 
hand, that the same system of Government did not suit 
the eventual transition to the multi-party democratic re-
gime (MAINWARING, 1993). 
In an analysis and confrontation between formal 
and non-formal institutions in African Democracies, 
it is possible to notice three informal institutions that 
seem especially relevant, namely: clientelism, corrup-
tion and the “Big Man” in presidentialism (BRATTON, 
2007).  is approach explains the danger of the personi-
 cation of power that the presidential system involves 
for the continent. As, in this system, regardless of the 
constitutional provisions, the power is heavily custom-
ised around the image of the President. He is, literally, 
above the law, he controls, in many cases, a large pro-
portion of the State property, without the necessary ac-
countability (WALLE, 2003).
With the political transition, i.e. the transition 
to multiparty democratic regimes, many African States, 
especially the Portuguese-speaking countries (PALOP), 
have opted for a semi-presidential system of Govern-
ment, mostly under the in uence of the Portuguese sys-
tem.  is option derives from the possibility that this sys-
tem of government allows the adequacy of the President 
and the Parliament’s powers, trying with that to “elimi-
nate some of the vices of the two pure systems: presiden-
tialism and parliamentarianism” (PEREIRA, 2013, p. 3). 
 e process of political transition in Africa is re-
lated to two fundamental issues. Firstly, the fact that few 
African countries have managed to achieve some degree 
of success in this process, where some of them have even 
reverted to authoritarian regimes or remained in what 
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we can de ne as “grey zone” between democracy and 
authoritarianism (CAROTHERS, 2002, p. 9). Secondly, 
in some countries that have reached the political transi-
tion, the political parties responsible for the national lib-
eration struggle and for independence won the elections 
that founded the democratic regime, as in the case of An-
gola (MPLA), Guinea-Bissau (PAIGC) and Mozambique 
(FRELIMO).  e exception is revealed in Cape Verde 
(MPD) and Sao Tome and Príncipe (PCD-GR), where the 
opposition came to power.
Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome 
and Principe and Cape Verde are Portuguese-speaking 
African States that, from an institutional point of view, 
have opted for the semi-presidential system, with di er-
ent features and settings.
Table: General characteristics of the systems of Government 
(1991/2011)
Countries
First 
multi-party 
elections
Number of 
parliamentary 
elections
Number of 
presidential 
elections
System of 
Government
Angola 1992 3 1
Semi-
presidential
Mozambique 1994 4 4
Semi-
presidential
Guinea-Bissau 1994 4 5
Semi-
presidential
Sao Tome and 
Príncipe
1991 5 5
Semi-
presidential
Cape Verde 1991 5 5
Semi-
presidential
Source: adapted African Elections Data Base (http://africanelections.tripod.com/ ).
In the case of Mozambique, the system is semi-
presidential, and the President is elected for a period of 
 ve years, and the Government is responsible before the 
National Assembly (ELGIE, 2008). Meanwhile, the “pow-
ers of the President are far above the other semi-presiden-
tial countries” (MACUANE, 2009, p. 182). On the one 
hand, the representation in the Parliament of the party 
of the President is the majority. On the other hand, the 
President appoints the Prime Minister assigning to him 
the governance functions, without, however, being pos-
sible to identify in the political practice if it is the Prime 
Minister who leads the Government.
In Angola, they opted for a constitutional law in 
1992, which allowed the consecration of a semi-presi-
dential system of government, with a strong presidential 
penchant (SANTOS, 2007). However, the practical con-
 guration of this system arouses debate among research-
ers, some of whom defending it is presidentialism and 
not semi-presidentialism. It is considered that the system 
took the parliamentary majority for the President to be-
come holder of the Government, discharging the exist-
ence of the Prime Minister (FEIJÓ, 2007). In this way, 
the President is the one who guides and sets the national 
policy of the Angolan people, dismisses and is able to ap-
point and exonerate the Prime Minister, presides over the 
Council of Ministers, dictates the dissolution of the Par-
liament, calls elections and referenda and he signs and 
promulgates the laws of the Parliament and the Govern-
ment decrees.
 e powers that are attributed to the President al-
low, in political practice, to characterise the Angolan gov-
ernment system as a system of presidential-parliamen-
tary tendency, where there is a constitutional imbalance 
between the powers conferred to the President and to the 
Parliament. However, under the terms of a new Consti-
tution approved in January 2010, the President must be 
elected indirectly by the members of the National Assem-
bly for a  ve-year term.
In Guinea-Bissau, the duration of the 1993 Consti-
tution allowed the adoption of a semi-presidential system 
of Government.  e political practices of the country and 
the struggle for power (AZEVEDO, 2009) have produced 
a system of Government with presidential tendency, to an 
extent that it is characterised as a strong semi-presidential 
system (KOSTA, 2007). We realise, through the Constitu-
tion of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, that the President 
has substantial legislative powers with the right of legisla-
tive being that, to overcome this veto power, two-thirds of 
votes cast are needed in Parliament.
Among the functions of the President of the Re-
public we highlight that of legislating, through presi-
dential decrees, without, however, consulting or hearing 
other legislative bodies, such as the Government and the 
Parliament.  us, this con guration strengthens even 
more the idea of a Guinean system with strong presi-
dential penchant.  e President also appoints the Prime 
Minister consulting the parties with parliamentary seat. 
We attest that, from the practical con guration of the 
Guinean government system, the concentration of pow-
ers in the person of the President hinders the process of 
paci cation of con icts between the bodies of national 
sovereignty.  e e ect of this process is the high probabil-
ity of harming the people of Guinea-Bissau, who deposit 
their con dence in a President who, by the structuring 
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of State institutions, is sometimes unable to manage the 
con icts.
In the particular case of Cape Verde, the con gu-
ration of the system of government has been the subject 
of permanent political and constitutional discussion, al-
lowing the adoption of di erent approaches, mainly from 
the political openness and the adoption of the Constitu-
tion of the Republic of Cape Verde (CRCV) in 1992. 
With the implementation of the  rst Republic 
(1975-1990) and with the election of the  rst People’s 
National Assembly, a system of Government character-
ised as parliamentary is emerging. To the Constitution of 
the People’s National Assembly   y-six MPs were elected 
and the PAIGC was the only party to participate in the 
elections, through a list submitted by a group of citizens 
devoted to it.  e Assembly had the power to elect the 
Prime Minister and the President of the Republic who 
was the General Secretary of the Party (Aristides Pereira), 
with real powers of governance, chairing all the Councils 
of Ministers and holding a special regulation on Foreign 
A airs and State Security.
 e 1980 Constitution of the Republic of Cape 
Verde stated the People’s National Assembly as the su-
preme organ of State power, and it decided on all the fun-
damental issues of the State internal and external policy, 
organised and monitored the application of the political, 
economic, social, cultural, defence and security lines set 
by the PAICV. It also had the power to dismiss or call new 
elections.  e election of this body happened every  ve 
years by direct universal su rage. 
 e implementation of the second Republic that 
happened with the political openness in 1990 symbol-
ised the democratisation period with new con gurations 
and the articulation of new political institutions in the 
Cape Verdean State panorama. It is also marked by the 
emergence or even the functionalisation of democratic 
pluralism, when the  rst multi-party elections in the his-
tory of Cape Verde were held on 13th January, 1991.  e 
strongest opposition Party, the MPD, won with a quali-
 ed majority of two thirds of the Members.  e elected 
National Assembly approved a new Constitution in Sep-
tember 1992, which overhauled the system of govern-
ment.  e President of the Republic and the National 
Assembly started being elected by direct and universal 
su rage, similar to what occurred in other countries that 
had the same semi-presidential system.  e Government 
is elected and formed according to the election results for 
the National Assembly, requiring approval by this one. 
Elections take place every  ve years (Parliament, Govern-
ment and President of the Republic), and for the Town 
Hall they take place every four years.
 e con guration of the new system of govern-
ment a er independence attributed to the President the 
power to dismiss or call new elections in the event of se-
rious institutional crisis, which undermine the integrity 
of the Cape Verdean Nation State and of its institutions. 
Meanwhile, since the political openness, researchers 
have been looking for a scienti c and political-consti-
tutional explanation to the Cape Verdean government 
system. Some claim this is rationalised or mitigated par-
liamentarianism; others prefer to talk of a semi-presi-
dential system; in any case, the system of government 
is an important issue and one of the most interesting of 
the Constitution of the Republic of Cape Verde (SILVA, 
2009, p. 197).
Carlos Veiga, in the opening speech of the pro-
gramme of the MPD party on the eve of the  rst parlia-
mentary elections in 1991, defended and thought to be 
best for Cape Verde the “mitigated parliamentarianism” 
system (ÉVORA, 2009, p. 178); Araújo (2000) de nes it 
as parliamentary in essence. For Évora (2009), the sys-
tem of government established in the 1992 Constitutional 
Charter is parliamentary. Fonseca (2004) calls it a “weak 
semi-presidential system”; Canotilho (2003) considers 
it as a mixed presidential-parliamentary system; Lima 
(2004), one of the researchers who best studied the Cape 
Verdean government system, describes it as semi-presi-
dential, suggesting however that it is the weakest of the 
semi-presidential systems. According to Canas and Fon-
seca (2007, p. 124) the system of government established 
by the CRCV is a semi-presidential system, like the “Por-
tuguese system of the 1976 Constitution, in which it was 
clearly inspired”.
Similar to the concept of some researchers, in re-
sponse to a current opinion in Cape Verde, Costa (2001) 
de nes the Cape Verdean government system, taking into 
account the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Cape 
Verde, as a semi-presidential system, a de nition inspired 
by Duverger and Elgie’s structure of analysis.  at system 
almost completely devalues the role of the Heads of State 
that are “monarchist or republican, reducing them to 
symbolic  gures, with no real power and who only per-
form protocol functions and are only system catalysts” 
(LARA, 2007, p. 28).
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 e debate between researchers and national and 
foreign personalities is not only scienti c but also party-
political. On the one hand, there is the Movement for 
Democracy party (MPD), and on the other, the African 
Party of for the Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV). 
 e PAICV positioned itself in favour of a semi-presi-
dential system, by assigning to the President the function 
of guarantor of National Unity and of the Constitution 
and as a result the MPD would oppose  rmly the semi-
presidential system, advocating the rationalised parlia-
mentarianism, considering that the Parliament should be 
the vital focus of the political system, the President could 
neither have governance functions nor interfere in the 
governance, and it was in this sense that these two clearly 
de ned positions marked the constitutional debate be-
tween 1990 and 1992. Today the consensus about the sys-
tem of government has not been achieved yet, “despite 
the rapprochement between the two parties, about one or 
another aspect” (SILVA, 2009, p. 199-200).
Regardless of the debate, we can scienti cally 
state, taking into account the classical theorists and the 
Constitution of the Republic of Cape Verde (1999), that 
the system of government is semi-presidential, for the 
following reasons: the President of the Republic is elected 
by universal, direct and secret su rage, by voters listed 
on national territory and abroad, under the law, as well 
as the Parliament; the President is elected for a period 
of  ve years, beginning with the inauguration and end-
ing with the inauguration of the new President elected. 
However, this is not enough to say that the Cape Verdean 
government system is semi-presidential, because in the 
presidential system, the President is also elected by direct 
and universal su rage.
Furthermore, we can also mention that it is the 
President of the Republic who appoints the Prime Min-
ister, a er hearing the political forces with a seat in the 
National Assembly and taking into account the results 
of the elections.  e President dismisses the Head of 
Government, but a er hearing the forces represented in 
Parliament.  e President also dissolves the National As-
sembly, a er complying with the provisions and hearing 
the political parties that have a seat there.  e National 
Assembly will be dissolved whenever, during the same 
parliamentary term, two motions of con dence to the 
Government are rejected.  e National Assembly may 
also be dissolved in case of a serious institutional crisis, 
whenever this is necessary for the proper functioning 
of democratic institutions, and this action, at the risk 
of legal absence, must be preceded by the assent of the 
Council of the Republic. And besides, the Cape Verdean 
executive power is cephalic, i.e., the Head of State shares 
power with the Head of Government, the Prime Minister 
(COSTA, 2001).  erefore, it can be said that the Cape 
Verdean government system is semi-presidential with 
speci c institutional con gurations that di erentiate it 
from other government systems.
 e Cape Verdean government system has its 
speci c con guration, starting with the relationship be-
tween the executive and the legislative powers and their 
political practice. One of the mechanisms to measure the 
prevalence of a power over the other is the duration of the 
o  ces. An o  ce that remains in power for a long time 
has the probability of being dominant over the legislature, 
“while an o  ce of brief duration must be quite weak” (LI-
JPHART, 2003, p. 153). Since the political openness and 
the  rst legislative election in 1991, the o  ces were al-
ways the majority, of long duration, allowing a stable and 
vigorous Executive.  e MPD has achieved two consecu-
tive terms (1991-1995) and the PAICV three consecutive 
terms (2001-2011), allowing a certain hegemony of the 
Executive over the Legislative (LIJPHART, 2003). Évora 
(2007) points out that all the legislative elections (1991 to 
2011) in analysis have produced absolute majorities, with 
the exception of 1991 and 1995, in which the MPD party 
got a quali ed majority. All these majorities enabled the 
Government a peaceful and quiet governance.
 e absolute majority in Parliament has shaped, 
to some extent, the relationship established between the 
legislative and the executive power, despite this, but by 
observing that in the political arena there is a strong party 
discipline, facilitating the approval of programmes sub-
mitted by the Government. Party discipline establishes 
the relationship between the Executive and the Legisla-
tive branches, although the Constitution assigns to the 
National Assembly the power to monitor the Executive, 
more speci cally the Government, using in many cas-
es the motion of censure, which did not happen in the 
case of Cape Verde, probably because it encountered a 
strong party discipline and stable parliamentary ma-
jorities achieved over several legislatures. Furthermore, 
in the Constitution of the Republic of Cape Verde, the 
Government has broad legislative powers in matters not 
designated to the Assembly, which exercises through 
decree-law, being able, in addition, “to produce legisla-
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tive decrees on matters of relatively reserved competence 
of the Assembly upon its authorisation” (CANAS; FON-
SECA, 2007, p. 126).
 e existence of a Government with the power to 
produce laws, which is the exclusive competence of the 
National Assembly, resulted, to some extent, in an im-
balance between the Executive and the Legislative pow-
ers, and the dominance of the Executive power over the 
Legislative. In 1992, the new Constitution turned out to 
establish a form of government that, in practice, deval-
ued the National Assembly “and reinforced the Executive 
powers” (ÉVORA, 2009, p. 185).  e author draws a few 
lines of important analysis that help understand this con-
 guration. First, with regard to the proposed law present-
ed and its approval in the di erent legislatures in Cape 
Verde (from 1991), we notice a clear predominance of 
the Executive over the Legislative, which is paradoxical, 
since legislating is a primary function of the Parliament; 
second, we note, in fact, that the Legislative has relative 
powers in the Cape Verdean government system, but the 
con guration of the institutions makes that, in practice, 
they are purely formal; third and last, the structure of the 
party system itself and the way how the Prime Minister is 
elected dictate the degree of power of the Parliament con-
sidering, then, that the parliamentary majority and the 
party discipline make the mandate of the Cape Verdean 
Executive even more stable.
With a two-party system, the executive power pre-
vails over the legislative power, in the Cape Verdean gov-
ernment system, since in bipolar systems, governments 
are safer.  e legitimacy of the government, which is the 
direct result of its electoral success, is high. In this sense, 
the ministerial crises, which occur only as a result of disu-
nity within the current majority, are not very frequent. 
Governments have a reasonable ability to consider long-
term projects, as they have more con dence that they 
will be in power for the time needed to implement them 
(MALAMUD, 2003)
4 Final remarks
 e article allowed us to understand important in-
stitutional con gurations in democracies, especially the 
separation of powers and the relationship that is estab-
lished in this  eld, with particular incidence in the legis-
lative and executive powers. We highlight the importance 
of the separation of powers, allowing institutions to be 
connected in an important web of interdependence and 
independence.  e article also allowed us to notice some 
variations in the relations between the powers, enabling 
us to emphasise that one thing is the ideal type; another 
thing is the practice resulting from this reality. In itself, 
the system of government can dictate the way the powers 
relate as well as the practical con gurations.  ese ob-
servations allowed to understand and explain the reality 
intrinsic to the Cape Verdean government system, with 
developed theoretical and constitutional evidence, and to 
argue that the system of government is semi-presidential, 
with speci c features and institutional con gurations. In 
the Cape Verdean government system, as in other African 
systems, the relationship between the legislative and the 
executive power is factual, despite the practical variations 
from what the Constitution advocates. All con gurations 
allow asserting that in the Cape Verdean government 
system there is a certain predominance of the executive 
power over the legislative, even if the principle of separa-
tion of powers contests such event.  is predominance 
could be related to a number of factors, such as: the party 
system con guration; the formatting of political institu-
tions such as political parties and the organisation of the 
political actors and social subjects. We believe, in this re-
gard, that the subject is open for possible analyses and 
further development which might contribute to a better 
problematisation of the issue under review.
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